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National Competition Policy (NCP), legislated in Australia in 1995, has arguably 
been the single most consequential economic policy over the past decade. Yet it has 
largely escaped sociological analysis. This paper investigates how the concept of the 
public interest in NCP has actually had the effect of legitimising neo-liberal 
ideologies concerning private, individual, economic interests. Using critical policy 
analysis, this paper examines how this legitimisation has occurred through: (1) the 
policy language of the public interest, and how this discourse has shifted over time; 
(2) the implementation of NCP, particularly the application of the public interest test; 
and (3) evidence proffered by dominant institutions about the social and economic 
distributional outcomes of NCP. This analysis demonstrates that the policy language 
and public discourse of the public interest has been used to secure hegemonic control 
to legitimate the interests of dominant groups.  
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Introduction 
Australia’s National Competition Policy (NCP) has driven the most far-reaching 
economic reforms at national and state levels over the past ten years. NCP actually 
comprises a broad set of legislative reforms endorsed by Commonwealth, State and 
Territory governments in 1995. NCP covers the Competition Policy Reform Act, the 
Conduct Code Agreement, the Competition Principles Agreement and the Public 
Interest Test, and the Agreement to Implement the National Competition Policy and 
Related Reforms. As a consequence, public utilities have been privatised, government 
services have been restructured as business enterprises, industries and professional 
groups have been exposed to market forces, and almost 2,000 pre-existing legislative 
Acts have been reviewed to ensure that they comply with competition principles. 
Debates about the purposes, implementation and outcomes of NCP have been 
polarised. Government and business sectors proclaim the benefits of a competitive 
economy, reinforcing the ideology that competition is in the public interest because it 
will ultimately enhance the well-being of all Australians. Other sectors – primarily the 
welfare and rural sectors – have attempted to expose the social and financial costs of 
unfettered competition. Much of this debate has been founded on conviction rather 
than critical policy analysis or the objective assessment of evidence. Academic 
interest in NCP has come primarily from economists; there has been surprisingly little 
sociological analysis of competition policy. In the opening section of this paper, I lay 
the groundwork for a sociological account of NCP by (1) briefly reviewing the 
literature on critical policy analysis and (2) explaining the relevance of the concept of 
the ‘public interest.’  
As a scholarly discipline, the critical study of policy language has emerged 
over the past decade or so. Critical policy analysis seeks to address the ways in which 
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language is used as a tool by powerful policy-makers and bureaucrats to shape 
community perceptions, and to reproduce and legitimate dominant ideologies and 
social structures. In Australia, critical policy analysis has been applied to a range of 
issues including public housing policy (Marston, 2000), the evolution in the meaning 
of welfare (Jamrozik, 2001), welfare reform (Bessant, 2002), the construction of 
welfare dependency labels (Engels, 2006), social exclusion (Jones and Smyth, 1999), 
the pathologising of domestic violence (McDonald, 2005) and the rhetoric of 
globalisation (Conley, 2004). However, there has been comparatively little critical 
policy analysis by sociologists in Australia on the ideology and outcomes of economic 
policy such as NCP. 
There is a compelling case for sociological investigation of economic policy. 
Jamrozik (2003: 666) defines social policy is a “mechanism for the allocation of a 
society’s material and human resources for the purpose of achieving certain outcomes 
that bring into fruition the society’s dominant values and corresponding interests, 
objectives and goals.” He goes on to argue that, as it is concerned with the distribution 
of resources, it is closely connected to economic policy. Economic – rather than 
sociological perspectives – have dominated analyses and commentary on social 
policy. Research on competition policy and regulation has been the province of 
economics; King (2003: 31) concluded that National Competition Policy (NCP) 
propelled a “wave of Australian economic research”. However, economic policy is 
underpinned by social values, cloaked in ideology, and has intentional and 
unintentional social outcomes. Sociologists, therefore, have a key role in economic 
policy analysis. 
Discourse around ‘the public interest’ has been a central, recurring theme used 
to both justify and defend neoliberal reform in Australia. NCP reforms are based upon 
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the following neo-liberalist ideology: exposing the public and private sectors to 
competitive market conditions will promote efficiency, unleash innovation, and 
stimulate increased productivity. This, it is declared, will benefit consumers and 
ultimately lead to an enhanced well-being for all Australians. Competition is 
presumed to be inherently good and desirable (Productivity Commission, 2005). NCP 
legislation actually requires that any restrictions on competition must be justified by, 
and objectively assessed against, a set of criteria of pertaining to the ‘public interest.’ 
As I argue in this paper, how the public interest is defined and how the public interest 
test has been applied can be understood as attempts by dominant institutions – 
particularly senior politicians from both major political parties, leading bureaucrats in 
the public service, organisations representing corporate business, and members of new 
right think tanks – to secure ideological and political hegemony. Following Gramsci 
(1971), hegemony refers to the legitimation of class domination through the 
engineering of consent. Hegemony is secured when ideas come to be accepted by the 
majority as natural, legitimate and beneficial, when in fact they are deployed by 
dominant groups to protect their own interests. 
The aims of this paper are to analyse: (1) the policy language and public 
discourse of the ‘public interest’ in NCP, and how this has shifted over time; (2) the 
implementation of NCP, particularly the application and function of the public interest 
test; and (3) claims made by competing groups about the social and economic 
distributional outcomes of NCP. The key texts analysed in this paper are 
parliamentary speeches, legislation and policy review documents published since the 
early 1990s, including reports by review committees of the House of Representatives 
and the Senate, the National Competition Council (NCC), the Productivity 
Commission (PC) and the Australian Competition and Consumer Commission 
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(ACCC). Both the theoretical underpinnings and the methodology for this paper 
follow Fairclough’s (1995; 2001; 2003) approach to critical discourse analysis: 
discourse can both construct and transform other elements of socio-political life. 
Discourse can be understood at three levels: textual analysis (the implied and received 
meanings of the words ‘the public interest’ in texts), discourse practice (how texts 
about NCP and the public interest are produced and interpreted), and sociocultural 
practice (how policy is legitimated and how the rhetoric of competition reproduces 
institutional structures). The next section opens a brief overview of NCP and then 
critically analyses the evolving policy language and public discourse about the public 
interest.  
 
National Competition Policy and the language of the public interest 
Contrary to popular belief, National Competition Policy did not originate from a 
Liberal government. Labor Prime Minister Hawke’s Ministerial Statement Building a 
Competitive Australia was a landmark speech in the microeconomic reform program 
of the 1990s. In a period of deep and prolonged recession, the Prime Minister declared 
that the “fundamental task facing this nation” was “improving the productive capacity 
of an economy that will be more economically competitive” (1991: 1-2). One of the 
key policy levers announced was an expansion of the scope of the Trade Practices Act 
to inject competition into “many areas of the Australian economy today that are 
immune from that Act: some Commonwealth enterprises, State public sector 
businesses, and significant areas of the private sector, including the professions” 
(1991: 7). The National Competition Policy Review, chaired by Professor Frederick 
Hilmer, was commissioned in 1992 to inquire into the promotion of competition in the 
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domestic economy. Hilmer’s (1993) key recommendations led to the formulation and 
adoption of NCP by the Council of Australian Governments.  
To understand just how far the language of competition policy has shifted over 
the past 15 years, it is instructive to analyse the text of the seminal speech Building a 
Competitive Australia. Hawke acknowledges the democratic, pluralist underpinnings 
of public policy: “Government has a duty to listen to and understand all legitimate 
community interests” and to “balance those interests” including those between the 
environment and industry (1991: 9). Hawke neither reifies the economy nor considers 
it superordinate in relation to society. Quality of life was valued alongside measures 
of economic output. These conceptions and policy goals can be seen in Hawke’s 
aspirations for Australia “to build a modern, growing, prosperous and competitive 
economy, within (emphasis added) a tolerant and fair society; a nation where quality 
of life counts for as much as quantity of output” (1991: 11). 
Hilmer’s own writings also reveal a qualified assessment about the benefits of 
competition and its consequences for the public interest. For example, he wrote that 
the National Competition Policy Review Committee “recognised that competition 
might not always be effective in achieving consumer benefits or that it might lead to 
conflicts with other social goals” (1994: 3). Rather than the doctrinaire free market 
theory later espoused in NCP, Hilmer advised that “The economic logic in which 
competition policy is based is still being formulated” (1994: 7).  He was equivocal 
about competition policy and appreciated its inherently political nature. He noted the 
“trade-offs” (1994: 9) that had to be made between competing interest groups: “For 
competition policy is not fundamentally about right or wrong, good or bad, but about 
the incentives to invent and produce efficiently, the benefits and costs of creating 
these incentives, and the ways in which the resulting benefits and costs are to be 
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distributed” (1994: 9). At this juncture in the historical development of Australian 
neo-liberalism, competition policy was not yet espoused as unified, fundamentalist 
doctrine. The tensions and contradictions in the ideology of neo-liberalism are readily 
evident (Larner, 2000), but it is apparent that the contest to secure hegemony had 
commenced. In Gramsci’s terms (1971: 12), we can also see the emergence of the 
operation of two major superstructural levels: the dominant business groups in civil 
society promoting ideas of economic growth, and the State or juridical government 
with the power to legally enforce consent. The dominant business groups include 
organisations such as the Business Council of Australia, and the raft of neo-liberal 
think tanks and forums launched over the past two decades or so including the 
Institute of Public Affairs, the Centre for Independent Studies, the H.R. Nicholls 
Society, the Tasman Institute, the Australian Institute of Public Policy, and the 
Institute for Private Enterprise (Cahill, 2004a; Goldfinch, 2002; Pusey, 1991).   
State-sponsored public discourse promoting the societal-wide benefits of NCP 
appears to have intensified from the mid-1990s. For example, in 1996 the NCC 
remarked on the “growing community consensus” that “a competitive economy is in 
the public interest” (National Competition Council, 1996: 17). A few years later, the 
President of the NCC pronounced: “The point is that competitive outcomes deliver 
greater benefits than non-competitive outcomes, in the absence of evidence to the 
contrary” (Samuel, 2001: 3). More recent discourse declares unilaterally that NCP has 
been in the public interest since “most parts of Australia have enjoyed strong 
economic growth, higher household incomes, higher employment and lower rates of 
unemployment” (Productivity Commission, 2005: 85). This evidence suggests that in 
Australia, as in Britain under Margaret Thatcher (Hall, 1988), ideological hegemony 
about the public interest of competition has gained the ascendancy. The modern state 
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bureaucracy in Canberra, represented by senior executive public servants, was 
instrumental in articulating and shaping Australia’s embrace of economic rationalism 
(Pusey, 1991). New right think tanks and institutes – backed by corporate funding and 
support from leading capitalists – did not so much exert direct policy influence as gain 
control of economic discourse: “the radical neo-liberal movement played an important 
role in demonising and disorganising opponents of neo-liberalism; it provided a 
language and conceptual arsenal from which those attempting to secure the hegemony 
of neo-liberalism were able to draw” (Cahill, 2004b: 24).  
In comparing this earliest language of Hawke’s Building a Competitive 
Australia with the present constructions of competition policy, I can discern five 
distinctive debasements concerning notions of the public interest. First, contemporary 
constructions recant the very existence of legitimate, alternative interests. This can be 
seen in the language of whom or what constitutes ‘the public interest’. Under 
competition policy, the ‘losers’ clearly don’t have interests that correspond with the 
public interest (Wragg, 2005); the public interest is, therefore, the only legitimate 
interest.  Second, as a corollary, there is no need for government to seek to balance 
competing interests. Where the impact of competition policy can be demonstrated to 
be disadvantageous to a particular community or industry, the government can 
authorise the payment of so-called ‘structural adjustment packages’. The 
disadvantages and costs – such as unemployment, the closure of industries, the 
population drift from rural communities, and “higher greenhouse gas emissions 
associated with reform-related increases in demand for electricity” – must not impede 
the scale or pace of reforms because they are of “substantial net benefit to the 
community as a whole” (Productivity Commission, 2005: 85). The government does 
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not need to balance competing interests; it only needs to ease the “transitional and 
distributional impacts” of competition policy (Productivity Commission, 2005: 85).   
The third contrast between early and present-day constructions of competition 
policy is that current public policy has subordinated social and environmental 
considerations to economic imperatives. ‘The public interest’ now equates with 
economic interests. Within this paradigm, social policies – such as welfare to work 
and mutual obligation – have a primary aim of maximising the productive utility of 
people. Environmental policies – couched in the language of sustainability – aim to 
ensure that resources can continue to be exploited to meet the needs of industry. The 
fourth shift in policy language has been a rejection of a dualist conception of valuing 
quality of life together with quantity of output. Instead, the hegemony of competition 
policy is that improving productivity will generate an enhancement of wellbeing. In 
other words, there is a direct and deterministic relationship between producing more 
and having a better life. The public interest is defined in terms of, and can be 
measured by, economic productivity. The final reconstruction of policy language 
under NCP has been the reification and superordination of ‘the economy’. Whereas 
early ideas expressed in Building a Competitive Australia held that an economy 
existed within society, current constructions subsume and subordinate social 
relationships within ‘the economy’. Over time, these reconstructions of the notion of 
the public interest have been used to legitimate the economic interests of business and 
corporations. In the next section, I examine the implementation of NCP, with 
particular reference to the application of ‘public interest test’ as one strategy whereby 
the “apparatus of state coercive power … ‘legally’ enforces discipline on those groups 
who do not consent’” (Gramsci, 1971: 12).   
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Engineering consent: securing hegemony through the ‘public interest 
test’ 
Hegemonic control of NCP has been effectively achieved by government using 
several strategies: legislative review; public sector ‘reform’; the creation of agencies 
to implement and assess the states’ and territories’ progress in meeting targets; a 
program of substantial financial payments; and the structuring of the ‘public interest 
test’ to silence opposition. The first four will be briefly discussed, before moving on 
to a more detailed analysis of the operation of the public interest test.  
NCP marked a radical, profound and audacious shift in policy formulation. 
First, the imperatives of competition became entrenched in all policy across Australia. 
NCP triggered a review of existing legislation and became a mandatory consideration 
for all new policy. Secondly, it reversed the onus of proof: because the free market 
was now proclaimed to be in the public interest, the burden of proof for restricting 
competition fell not upon the legislators, but on those who wanted to curtail the 
operation of the free market (Productivity Commission, 2005: 136). The guiding 
principles of this legislative revision is that restrictions on competition must be 
expunged unless they can be “shown to confer a net benefit on Australia and unless 
restricting competition is the only way to achieve the objective of the legislation” 
(Centre for International Economics, 1999: iv). In formulating NCP legislation, the 
policymakers made a presumption in favour of competition. This presumption was 
based on the free market ideology that: (1) the competitive marketplace is the most 
effective allocative mechanism for producing and distributing goods and services; (2) 
individuals (or, as they are recast in the language of the Competition Principles 
Agreement “consumers”) participating in the market can more effectively and 
efficiently meet their needs; and (3) competition policy will generate net community 
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benefits (Tito, 2001). Over the past eleven years, Commonwealth, State and Territory 
governments have been stridently implementing NCP legislation. For example, in the 
four years to the end of 2000, governments examined and, as appropriate, revised over 
1,800 pieces of legislation restricting competition (Centre for International 
Economics, 1999). As Larner (2000) explains, neo-liberalism may demand smaller 
government, but not necessarily reduced governance. Legislative review is one 
example of coercive action that forces institutions and individuals to obey the 
operation of the so-called ‘free’ market.  
Australia’s scale and pace of neoliberal reform through NCP has been nothing 
short of staggering. The public sector – denounced as one of the “sheltered area(s) of 
the economy” (National Competition Council, 1999: 5) – has been “structurally 
reformed” (Productivity Commission, 2005: xv), which is code for the 
corporatisation, commercialisation, outsourcing and privatisation of public utilities 
and other government services. The electricity, gas, water, telecommunications and 
transport sectors, among others, have been carved up and the profitable sections sold 
off. The remaining sections either retain narrow regulatory functions or have been 
transformed into leaner business units which now deliver fully-costed, user-pays 
services to ‘clients’. In fact, a recent international review of economic reform lauded 
that “Australia has been at the forefront of competition reform initiatives, or at least 
on a par with selected OECD counterparts” (National Competition Council, 2004: 7). 
Reforms such as these carry substantial financial incentives. The Commonwealth 
rewards State and Territory Governments for compliance with NCP through 
competition payments. In 2005-06, a total of $834 million was paid out. Over the past 
nine years, $5.3 billion has been allocated (see NCC website www.ncc.gov.au).This 
has been a most effective inducement: the Productivity Commission has noted that 
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“the threat of even quite small reductions in competition payments for non-
compliance with NCP commitments seems to have had a salutary effect on lagging 
jurisdictions” (2005: 381).  
How are we to understand the extent of this hegemonic control? Larner (2000) 
has challenged the argument about the ‘programmatic coherence’ of New Zealand’s 
neo-liberalism. She contends that “such analyses inadvertently reconstruct its 
hegemony” (2000: 14). By comparison, given the scale of Australia’s legislative 
review, the ready adoption of NCP by both Liberal and Labor governments at federal, 
state and territory levels (aside from some resistance by the Queensland government 
in the mid- to late-1990s), the wholesale restructuring of the public sector, and the 
effectiveness of the payment regime, it is difficult not to conclude that we have 
witnessed a high degree of hegemonic control exercised by government. 
However, when we turn our attention to the ‘public interest test’ under NCP, there 
is evidence in official documents about early contestation for hegemonic control. As a 
legislative Act, The Public Interest Test places the onus of proof on those benefiting 
from a restriction on competition to demonstrate that it should be retained” 
(Productivity Commission, 2005: 134). The sophistry of this argument is that the Act 
places the responsibility upon the very individuals and groups who are disadvantaged 
by competitive markets to put up a compelling case as to why NCP should be 
curtailed. It is these disadvantaged individuals and groups (the ‘losers’ in the 
competition who, by definition, lack knowledge, power and resources in the 
marketplace) who have little capacity to participate effectively in legislative reviews. 
The competitive marketplace values individuals according only to their productive or 
consumptive capacity: those with no capacity have no value (Valentine, 1999).  
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Clause 1(3) of the Competition Principles Agreement of National Competition 
Policy, provides for “public interest” matters to be considered in assessing the 
benefits and costs of reforms relating to competitive neutrality, public monopolies and 
legislation reviews. The clause specifies that, in pursuing the objectives of 
competition policy, the following matters should, where relevant, be taken into 
account when reviewing policy or deciding on a course of action: 
• “government legislation and policies relating to ecologically sustainable 
development; 
• social welfare and equity considerations, including community service 
obligations; 
• government legislation and policies relating to matters such as occupational 
health and safety, industrial relations and access and equity; 
• economic and regional development, including employment and investment 
growth; 
• the interests of consumers generally or of a class of consumers; 
• the competitiveness of Australian businesses; and  
• the efficient allocation of resources” (National Competition Council, 1998: 14-
15). 
On the face of it, NCP legislation articulates a comprehensive and inclusive set of 
factors that are to be considered when assessing the public interest. In practice, the 
public interest test has been used to persuade the general public about the benefits of 
competition and to weaken opposition from subordinate groups to the NCP. 
The NCC interprets the public interest as being “consistent with economic 
efficiency goals and the interests of the community as a whole” (1996: 3) rather than 
“providing special treatment for certain groups at the expense of others” (Samuel, 
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2001: 5). Graeme Samuel, the President of the NCC, offers the neat rationale that 
since “most anti-competitive restrictions benefit someone”, liberating market forces 
will squeeze the interests of “a small minority who have traditionally been well 
insulated from competition” (2001: 5). The public benefit of reform is thus delivered 
in the form of reduced prices “dispersed over millions of Australian consumers” and 
lower input costs for Australian producers (2001: 5). In these terms, ‘the public 
interest’ has three constituent elements: (1) it is defined exclusively in monetary terms 
(lower production costs and cheaper goods and services), thus ignoring social, 
political, cultural and environmental considerations; (2) the public is cast as 
consumers and producers – not as citizens of a society; and (3) public benefit is 
measured as the aggregate of the economic gains of all individuals. Thus, the public 
interest is the sum of gains in total income and Gross Domestic Product across 
Australia: “The aggregate benefit across all players is significant in terms of real 
incomes, economic growth and (through benefits to exporters) Australia’s external 
stability” (Samuel, 2001: 6). The Council of Australian Government’s (CoAG’s) 
position is similar. The recent review of NCP is replete with references to the benefits 
of competition policy being “net income gains”, a growth in GDP of 2.5% and a “one 
percentage point surge in labour productivity” (Council of Australian Governments, 
2006: 5).    
The notion of “the public interest” has a long and contested history. Flathman 
observed that the concept lacks “operational meaning” and that “a number of writers 
have reached very pessimistic conclusions” about its value (1966: 9). The imprecision 
and elusiveness of the term seems to be render it useful “for the very issues where 
certainty of judgement is impossible” (Mulgan, 2000: 5). Judgements about what is in 
‘the public interest’ are “inherently complex and contestable” (Mulgan, 2000: 7) 
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because of the multiplicity of interests operating at individual, community, sectional 
and national levels. There is no accepted algorithm for calculating and weighting the 
value of these multiple interests to reach consensus about whether a particular 
decision is in the public interest.  
The Productivity Commission acknowledges that determining the “public interest” 
is fraught with problems: there are “complexities associated with attempting to 
identify all of the (longer term) winners and losers of reform before the event” 
(1999a: 331). The “losers” should generally be helped by available assistance 
measures. Adjustment assistance to address any “large, regionally concentrated costs” 
should only be awarded to: 
• “facilitate, rather than hinder, the necessary change; 
• be targeted to those groups where adjustment pressures are felt most acutely; 
• be transparent, simple to administer and of limited duration; and 
• be compatible with general ‘safety net’ arrangements” (1999: 395). 
In fact, Margetts argues that the public interest provisions under NCP were kept 
deliberately vague in early parliamentary debates since “Any further tightening or 
clarification of public interest considerations may have resulted in the fragile 
competition policy agreements falling apart” (2001: 289). Hegemonic control 
involves political struggle. Gramsci (1970: 182) describes how the state is in a 
“continuous process of formation and superseding of unstable equilibria” in which the 
“interests of the dominant group prevail.”  
By the late 1990s, the NCC’s interpretation of “the public interest” had 
evidently failed to gain a hold with all members of the public. The Senate Select 
Committee on the Socio-economic Consequences of the National Competition Policy 
was commissioned to inquire into, among other things, “clarification of the definition 
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of public interest and its role in the National Competition process” (Parliament of the 
Commonwealth of Australia, 2000: vii). The Senate Select Committee’s Interim 
Report (Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, 1999) noted that throughout 
its hearings and submissions, one of the major difficulties expressed was with the 
interpretation and understanding of the public interest test. A major problem was that 
the narrow economic focus of the public interest test was attributed to that fact that 
responsibility for implementation of NCP at State and Territory level had been 
assigned to the Treasury or Premiers’ portfolios. This hardened the prevailing 
economic approach and narrowed the conceptualisation of the public interest test 
(Productivity Commission, 1999a: 325). 
The Senate Select Committee found that “there is general confusion and 
misunderstanding over what constitutes the ‘public interest’. When combined with the 
administrative ease of simply seeking to measure outcomes in terms of price changes, 
there is a risk that the policy will be applied in a narrow, restrictive ‘public interest’ 
test rather than one which takes account of the wider social impacts” (Parliament of 
the Commonwealth of Australia, 2000: xiv). The Committee recommended: 
“For the purposes of measuring outcomes of the policy, a method of 
assessment be agreed by CoAG which will provide a numerical weighting that 
can be attributed to environmental, social and employment factors, wherever 
possible. 
That the NCC publish a detailed explanation of the public interest test and 
how it can be applied and produces a list of case histories where the public 
interest test has been applied as a regularly updated service of decisions. This 
may form part of the information available through the proposed ‘one-stop-
shop’ advisory service. 
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That CoAG agree on a standardised public interest test procedure to be used in 
cases where a review has implications across state or territory borders. 
That a ‘hotline’ service be set up for organisations seeking information and 
assistance on how to use the public interest test and review processes. This 
service should be reviewed after twelve months operation” (2000: xiv-xv). 
Only one of these recommendations was enacted: the NCC did publish three 
Community Information Papers in August 2000. However, the papers were primarily 
used to publicly highlight anti-competitive practices by certain professional groups, 
rather than educate and advise the public about how to ensure their interests were 
considered in the application of the public interest test.  
The Senate Select Committee’s Interim Report also noted that the application 
of the public interest test was marked by inconsistencies, non-disclosures and power 
imbalances. The primary concerns were “differing interpretations of the policy and 
public interest test between the States and Territories resulting in different 
applications covering essentially the same conduct; lack of transparency of reviews; 
and lack of appeal mechanisms” (Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, 
1999: 101). It is notable that there is no formal requirement under NCP for review 
reports to be made public – or even to be forwarded to the NCC. Some reviews have 
been made public, but others have not (Productivity Commission, 2005: 142).  
It is evident that the Productivity Commission’s interpretation of the public 
interest test did not intend to obstruct or delay reform under NCP. For example, the 
Commission noted that “NCP operates alongside, and in conjunction with, other 
policies which aim to address directly environmental, regional development and 
social concerns. Better community outcomes may be achieved by implementing a 
particular reform and using more specific policies to address social concerns. This 
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may be preferable to using the ‘public interest’ test in a way that results in a reform 
being stalled or its benefits diminished” (Productivity Commission, 1999a: 323). The 
public interest test is used as a tool to root out anti-competitive behaviour but not to 
block economic reform. Those who might be disadvantaged by economic reform – the 
competition ‘losers’ such the unemployed, the poor, people with disabilities, those 
living in rural areas, and community advocates – stand little chance of mounting 
successful public interest tests. The sheer volume and scale of the legislative review 
process unleashed by NCP meant that consumer and welfare groups with a broad 
public interest stance were overwhelmed: “There has been little provision of 
information about NCP in a form which makes it understandable to the public at 
large. Ordinary citizens often don’t know about the reviews and, when they do, have 
had little assistance in understanding the complex issues that may relate to their 
interests” (Tito, 2001: 10).  
From this evidence we can conclude that hegemony involves struggle and 
contestation. There are many instances of the tussle for political control of the 
definition and measurement of the public interest. It is also evident that the state, by 
minimising public education about the public interest test and restricting publication 
of test cases, sought to quash potential challenges to the NCP. The Productivity 
Commission perversely describes the public interest test as a mechanism to lock in 
economic reforms and win community acceptance of competition policy: “An 
effective public interest test is essential to secure beneficial reforms and to enhance 
community acceptance of the reform process” (Productivity Commission, 2005; xxv).  
A recent CoAG review (2006) demonstrates that hegemony is never absolute: efforts 
to secure political control (through manipulating the function of the public interest 
test) and ideological domination (through ongoing ‘public education’) must continue. 
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The CoAG review agreed that “governments should take a lead role in explaining to 
the community the benefits of reform” and that public interest tests must be applied so 
as to “prevent backsliding” into anti-competitive practices (Council of Australian 
Governments, 2006: 6). This demonstrates that both the policy and public discourse of 
‘the public interest’ has been constructed and deployed as an effective ideological tool 
to legitimate neoliberalist policies. The next section examines in more detail how the 
public interest test is used to quash those who lose through competition policy. 
 
Public discourse about the outcomes of National Competition Policy 
In terms of the public interest, what have been the social and economic consequences 
of NCP? The answer to this question is beyond the scope of this paper. However, we 
can see how the key policy makers and other advocates and beneficiaries of NCP have 
assembled evidence about its effectiveness to shape community perceptions. We can 
also start to critique this evidence with the aim of challenging the prevailing 
discourse. 
The interests and agenda of powerful authorities – chief among them the 
senior government ministers, the CoAG, the NCC, the PC, new right think tanks and 
institutes, and the Business Council of Australia – have coalesced to set the prevailing 
discourse about the beneficial effects of competition policy. This is the glossy, public 
arena occupied by impressive-looking economic performance indicators and 
exhortations for further reform that are peppered throughout ministerial speeches, 
consultants’ reports and CoAG communiqués. The orthodoxy is that NCP has yielded 
substantial and sustained economic benefits for Australia. For instance, CoAG noted 
that “the PC concluded that the NCP had delivered net substantial benefits to the 
Australian economy. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and (OECD) and 
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the International Monetary Fund (IMF) have also affirmed that the wide ranging 
structural reforms and sound macroeconomic policies were the main reasons 
Australia’s economic performance has strengthened significantly in recent decades” 
(Council of Australian Governments, 2006: 5). The Business Council of Australia 
argues that our period of “concerted microeconomic reform” has produced 
significantly improved international rankings of economic performance including 
GDP, household wealth, real income, unemployment, and, moreover, that this has 
“benefited people at both ends of the socio-economic spectrum” (2005: 7). The 
Council argues that it is important to “clearly, frequently and publicly articulate(d)” 
the “benefits and drivers of strong economic growth” so as to press ahead with the 
neoliberal agenda; “quantifying the reform ‘dividend’ for people is important to 
justify the case for further reform” (2005: 2). The Productivity Commission is just as 
effusive about the effect of competition policy. It concludes that NCP probably 
contributed to the rise in average household incomes over the past decade, but 
acknowledges that the benefits have not been evenly spread across income groups. 
There have been  “some ‘losers’ as well as ‘winners’ … it is apparent that NCP has 
led to job losses and reduced incomes in some regional communities, though it is 
apparent that other regional centres have often gained from the reforms” (Productivity 
Commission, 2005: 85). The Commission further asserts that “most parts of Australia 
have enjoyed strong economic growth, higher household incomes, higher employment 
and lower rates of unemployment” and concludes that “it is hard to sustain a case that 
the social, regional or environmental impacts of NCP have been generally 
detrimental” (2005: 123).  
These official discourses represent a concerted and sustained campaign to win 
over public commitment to competition policy. George (1999: 3) contends that the 
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worldwide campaign has succeeded: “…the ideological and promotional work of the 
right has been absolutely brilliant. They have spent hundreds of millions of dollars, 
but the result has been worth every penny to them because they have made neo-
liberalism seem as if it were the natural and normal condition of mankind.” To the 
author’s knowledge, there is no conclusive empirical research measuring the extent to 
which competition policy is popularly supported in Australia or whether the ideology 
has been internalised among the general population. More importantly, if we construct 
neo-liberalism as a “monolithic apparatus” and then draw our analyses exclusively 
from official accounts of the outcomes of NCP, we “inadvertently reconstruct its 
hegemony” (Larner, 2000: 14). Thus, we must seek out oppositional accounts. 
Though fragmented and commonly in narrative form, the qualitative evidence 
about the negative outcome of NCP is substantial. The evidence can be extracted from 
the hundreds of submissions by individuals, community groups, welfare agencies, and 
local governments to reviews about the impact of NCP. Extracts from submissions to 
the Senate Select Committee investigating the socio-economic consequences of NCP 
(Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia) show that the competition ‘losers’ 
report experiencing “the loss of human capital” (2000: 87) and “the withdrawal of 
financial services from the bush” (2000: 88). They “question whether, if every 
Australian is 1c better off but that is at the cost of some small towns in rural and 
regional Australia, the quality of life in this nations is really that much better” (2000: 
85). Environmental agencies such as the Australian Greenhouse Office express 
concern with aspects of the National Electricity Market: “Some proposals are assessed 
under a net customer benefit test and others under a net public benefit test, neither test 
takes account of externalities such as greenhouse gas emissions” (2000: 109). In his 
submission, Senator Bob Brown argued that “National Competition Policy is seen by 
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many to be an institutionalised cash-cow for large corporations at the expense of 
small business, the community (especially in the less profitable rural and regional 
areas), and the environment” (2000: 137).  
Competition policy was also seen by ‘losers’ as responsible for the “demise of 
small businesses” who found it “impossible to match the capital, advertising and price 
cutting wars engaged in by the mega-retailers” (Productivity Commission, 1999a: 
228). Other evidence from small town studies confirm the strong perception that “the 
wellbeing of entire communities is under threat from the cumulative effects of policy 
changes” (Hallebone, Townsend and Mahoney, 2000). A recent review of electricity 
reform in Victoria found that the price benefits of full retail competition had been 
unevenly distributed: advantages have accrued to higher volume businesses and 
metropolitan users in preference to low-volume and rural customers, and the number 
of disconnections had risen over the past five years (Consumer Law Centre Victoria 
and the Centre for the Study of Privatisation and Public Accountability, 2006). These 
narratives disclose a rival account of the economic, social and environmental effects 
of NCP.  
Conley (2004: 195) argues that governments have successfully “utilised 
rhetoric to persuade Australians that there are no alternatives to the continuous 
adoption of economic liberal policies.” If this has been achieved, then the foregoing 
analysis at least suggests that dominant groups have not yet secured complete 
ideological hegemony about the beneficial outcomes of competition policy. While 
there are no readily discernible alternative economic systems, there is not the illusion 
among all groups of a common interest. The so-called “trickle-down” effect has not 
reached everyone.  In light of this, Larner (2000: 20) advocates that neo-liberalism 
 22
should be theorised as a “multi-vocal and contradictory phenomenon” to render 
visible the political and ideological struggles.  
 
Conclusion 
In this paper I have argued that sociological analyses of economic policy can yield 
important insights into the way in which policies are constructed and deployed to 
shape ideas and support dominant interests. I have presented a case study of the 
ideological function of National Competition Policy, with specific reference to the 
how the notion of ‘the public interest’ has been constructed to legitimate neoliberal 
economic reform. Analysis of official documents reveals the actions of the coercive 
power of the state (Gramsci, 1971: 12) in three arenas: the deployment of policy 
language, the definition and application of the public interest test, and the production 
and dissemination of data to convince the public of the beneficial outcomes of 
competition policy.  
This study can not determine the extent to which “spontaneous consent” 
(Gramsci, 1971: 12) to competition policy has been given by the general public, or the 
extent to which ideological hegemony has been achieved concerning economic 
reforms justified in the public interest. By primarily relying upon analysis of official 
documents, we can not discern whether these ideas have been internalised across all 
dominant and subordinate groups in society. The problem with analysing policy 
documents is that we rely heavily upon official discourses in government reports and 
other versions of the truth written by the dominant groups, and thus run the risk of 
constructing hegemonic accounts. Future policy analysis must include the experiences 
and knowledge those groups who dissent, resist or are invisible and silenced. Further 
research is also needed to identify the winners and losers from competition policy, 
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and to map the locational and distributional inequities arising from neo-liberalism. 
These findings may help to challenge the prevailing public discourse. 
This paper has revealed that attempts to secure hegemonic control involve 
historical and ongoing contestation by dominant groups and the state – acting at times 
in concert and at other times in fragile, shifting coalitions. Larner (2000) calls for a 
new theorising of neo-liberalism to challenge its depiction as a monolithic, coherent 
program. This can occur through attending to its tenuous, chimerical, fragmentary, 
contingent and logically inconsistent features. Challenging neo-liberalism can also be 
achieved through closer analysis of specific neo-liberal projects (such as, for example, 
the current attempts to privatise Australia’s water and wastewater services). 
Competition policy’s next foray will target essential and universal services including 
health, education, water and environmental regulation (NCC, 2004) – services which 
have traditionally been seen as legitimate government functions operating outside the 
market. As a result, additional and more complex contestations between dominant and 
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